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Understanding Statutory Bundles: 
Does the Sherman Act Come with the 1996 Telecommunications Act? 
 
Randal C. Picker* 
 
Three recent appellate decisions—Goldwasser, Trinko and Covad—have addressed the in-
terplay of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the antitrust laws. This area raises questions of 
both substantive law and standing. This essay focuses on standing and in particular the question 
of how the antitrust doctrine in Illinois Brick should apply to situations in which there is an al-
leged breach of an access duty owed by an incumbent local exchange carrier. That access duty 
might arise under the 1996 Act itself or under applicable antitrust doctrines, such as the essen-
tial facilities doctrine or the duty to deal with competitors seen in Aspen Skiing. The essay sets 
forth a model of access duties leading to entry and Cournot duopoly and evaluates outcomes 
when that access duty is breached. The essay discusses various approaches to allocating suit 
rights depending on the purpose of enforcing the duty. I argue that the Illinois Brick doctrine 
which bars suits by consumers as indirect purchasers should have little application to the breach 
of access situation as the de facto compensation rationale of Illinois Brick won’t operate when 
the entrant has been denied the mandated access. 
 
 
As we approach seven years under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, we are developing a 
meaningful case law about how the Act works. The Act has been to the Supreme Court twice—
and for better or worse—will probably be back soon.1 One issue that will almost certainly go to 
the Court in the near future is the question of how the antitrust laws and the 1996 Act should be 
integrated. Three appellate courts have addressed this question—two in the last six months—and 
other circuits will soon get their swings in. 
Section I of the paper briefly sets out the issues seen in the three leading appellate decisions. 
Section II sets out a simple model of the social welfare consequences of an access breach and 
various approaches to assigning lawsuit rights to entrants and consumers. Section III matches up 
the results of the model with how the substantive law of antitrust and the 1996 Act interact to-
gether and with standing rules for telecommunications and antitrust, and in particular, the anti-
trust doctrine in Illinois Brick, which bars consumers from suing their remote sellers—
manufacturers typically but here possibly the local exchange carrier required by the 1996 Act to 
give access to unbundled network elements. 
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I. A Quick Tour of the Cases 
To plunge in and set the scene quickly, in mid-2000, the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in 
Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.2 In Goldwasser, consumer plaintiffs brought a class-action com-
plaint against their local phone company. The complaint set forth 20 alleged violations of the 
1996 Act. These were alleged as violations of the Act itself, and without more, as violations of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which bars monopolization and attempted monopolization. The 
plaintiffs sought treble damages for the Sherman Act violations and declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The district court dismissed the complaint under the filed rate doctrine, which, under cer-
tain circumstances, protects from inquiry rates authorized by a regulator,3 and for lack of antitrust 
standing. 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Court noted that while antitrust does impose 
some obligations on an incumbent to deal with other firms—seen most notably in Terminal Rail-
road and Aspen Skiing4—those duties are relatively limited. In contrast, the 1996 Act creates 
broad sharing obligations based on status—status as a local exchange carrier or an incumbent lo-
cal exchange carrier—without regard to any showing of monopolization under Section 2. Regard-
less of your views of the controversial essential facilities doctrine,5 there is little doubt that the 
detailed access obligations of the 1996 Act go far beyond whatever access rights exist under the 
antitrust laws, as the Seventh Circuit quickly found. That meant that to just allege a violation of 
the access rules of the 1996 Act, without more, insufficiently alleged a violation of the Sherman 
Act. 
The Seventh Circuit went on to consider whether a properly alleged essential facilities claim 
could be maintained notwithstanding the 1996 Act. The plaintiffs indeed did allege that they had 
made out such claims. The Court held that access obligations imposed through antitrust litigation 
could conflict with those imposed under the Act by state commissions or the FCC and that the 
more specific regulations set forth in the 1996 Act took “precedence over the general antitrust 
laws.”6 The Seventh Circuit noted that the antitrust savings clause contained in the Act7 would 
                                                                                                                                                              
zon (forthcoming, The Supreme Court Review, 2003). 
2 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000). 
3 Reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986). 
4 United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
5 Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J.  841 (1990); Dennis 
W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 
68 Antitrust L.J. 659 (2001). 
6 Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at. 401. 
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operate elsewhere, where less detailed regulation posed less of a potential for conflict between the 
antitrust laws and the 1996 Act. 
The Second Circuit jumped in mid-2002 in its decision in Trinko.8 AT&T had entered into an 
interconnection agreement with NYNEX pursuant to Sec. 252 of the 1996 Act. That agreement, 
which was approved by a New York state commission,9 contained a dispute resolutions clause 
setting forth the “exclusive remedy” for violations of the agreement. AT&T soon alleged breach 
and on March 9, 2000, Bell Atlantic—NYNEX’s successor after a merger—entered into a con-
sent decree regarding the alleged violations, plus it paid $3 million to the United States and $10 
million to AT&T and other competitor for losses. 
Soon after that, Trinko filed a class action against Bell Atlantic—now Verizon after a merger 
with GTE—alleging violations of the 1996 Act and the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed 
based on a conflict between the antitrust laws and the 1996 Act and on the view that Trinko was 
seeking to assert rights that belonged to AT&T. On appeal to the Second Circuit, a number of 
issues were raised, most of which are not the focus of this essay and which I shall therefore ig-
nore.10 The Second Circuit turned to whether Trinko could satisfy the rules for antitrust standing 
under the doctrine of Illinois Brick, which announced a rule barring indirect purchasers from pur-
suing antitrust claims against their indirect sellers (a consumer buyer from a retailer didn’t have 
antitrust standing to sue the manufacturer).11 I pursue that issue in more detail below. On the anti-
trust claims themselves, the Second Circuit found that Trinko had alleged independent antitrust 
claims—that is, claims that did not allege antitrust violations merely because of violations of the 
interconnection rules of the 1996 Act. That distinguished Trinko from Goldwasser, where the 
antitrust claims were purely derivative of the 1996 Act. 
This therefore squarely presented a situation where the same act might violate both the anti-
trust laws and the 1996 Act. Under prior Second Circuit caselaw, the court would not find im-
plicit immunity through the 1996 Act from the antitrust laws absent “plain repugnancy.” And for 
the court to reach that conclusion, it would have to do so in the face of a specific savings clause 
contained in the 1996 Act which provides that “nothing in this Act or the amendments made by 
                                                                                                                                                              
7 47 U.S.C. § 152, Historical and Statutory Notes. 
8 Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 294 F.3d 307 (2nd Cir. 2002), cert petition pending. 
9 Order Approving Interconnection Agreement, Case 96-C-0723, 1997 WL 410707 (N.Y.P.S.C. June 10, 1997). 
10 These included whether Trinko had standing under the Communications Act to assert alleged violations of the anti-
discrimination provisions of Sec. 202 of that Act—the Second Circuit found that he did—and whether Trinko had 
standing to assert an alleged violation of Sec. 251, where the court avoided the standing question as it concluded that 
the defendant had complied with Sec. 251 in entering into an interconnection agreement with AT&T. 
11 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
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this Act … shall be construed to modify, impair or supercede the applicability of any of the anti-
trust laws.”12 The Second Circuit concluded that that makes the plain repugnancy notion an uphill 
fight. 
The Second Circuit then considered the question of how antitrust remedies might intersect 
with the 1996 Act. The court saw damages in favor of consumers such as Trinko as unproblem-
atic, as damages create no conflicting requirements. Indeed, the court viewed damages to Trinko 
as useful “consumer compensation” absent under the 1996 Act.13 In contrast, the court saw in-
junctive remedies under the antitrust laws as possibly creating conflicts with the statutory inter-
connection requirements of the 1996 Act and thus urged “particular judicial restraint.”14 Finally, 
the court made clear that it was not addressing the power of a potential entrant to pursue antitrust 
claims.15 Instead, at the close of Trinko, we have consumers positioned to pursue antitrust claims 
and potential entrants proceeding under the interconnection regime of the 1996 Act. 
One week later, in Covad Communications Co. v. Bellsouth Corp.,16 the Eleventh Circuit 
held that an entrant could sue under both the 1996 and antitrust law for alleged breaches of inter-
connection duties. Covad properly alleged a series of antitrust claims—essential facilities, refusal 
to deal and a price squeeze—and the key question was whether those claims were preempted by 
the 1996 Act. The court followed the analysis in Trinko—plain repugnancy required, plus the 
savings clause analysis—added a tour of the legislative history, and rejected the analysis in 
Goldwasser to the extent that it conflicted with the analysis in Covad. 
II. Enforcing Access Rights 
As a matter of first principles, it is hard to understand why we could not apply both the 1996 
Telecommunications Act and the Sherman Act. Actually, that formulation is a little crude though 
it captures the spirit of the idea. Imagine access regulations consisting of detailed statutory man-
dates coupled with general fill-in powers. We normally understand fill-in powers to reflect the 
considerable costs of specifying ex ante rules that will apply to difficult-to-imagine future states 
of the world. So we legislate in specifics for the things that we understand now and build in flexi-
bility to address changes in the future. This is a conventional way of describing incomplete con-
tracts written by private parties. We might also understand general powers to allow legislative 
                                                     
12 47 U.S.C. § 152, Historical and Statutory Notes. 
13 Trinko at 328. 
14 Id. at 329. 
15 Id. at 329 n.16. 
16 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) 
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deals to be reached when there might not be agreement on more specific language, where each 
side is betting on how the regulator will interpret the language.17 
Note that put this way, we have said nothing about who should make decisions about imple-
menting this mixed scheme of general and specific statutory mandates. One regulator? Two? A 
mix of federal and state regulators? Courts? Private plaintiffs? Put this way, these are obviously 
very broad questions that go far beyond the limited aims of this essay. So, to track the issues in 
Goldwasser, Trinko and Covad, focus on private plaintiffs and consider two natural candidates: 
the blocked competitor and consumers. 
The competitor who does not receive access may—or may not—suffer lost profits. Consum-
ers may be harmed as well, as consumer surplus might be higher absent the access breach. Some 
harmed consumers will be those who actually consume the end-product. These inframarginal con-
sumers get as much of the good as they would have absent the breach, but they pay more for the 
good because of the reduction in competition caused by the access breach. From a social stand-
point, we need to have a distributional metric to assess these consumers, as output hasn’t changed 
for them and we have just transferred value from these consumers to the incumbent. We have a 
second group of consumers as well. These are consumers who would have purchased the good at 
the lower prices that would have resulted from competition under the mandated access. 
It might help to have a little toy model to play with to talk through these issues. Consider an 
industry with a demand curve given by p = z – q. This obviously is just a very simple linear de-
mand curve. Assume that the incumbent has a fixed marginal cost of c to produce each unit of the 
good in question. The incumbent has a blocking position, so absent an entrant gaining access to 
the incumbent’s technology, the incumbent will have a monopoly. 
If the incumbent monopolist maximizes profits, with a little math, we have enough informa-
tion to calculate profits and consumer surplus. These are given by: 
 ( )2
4
1 czM −=Π , ( 2
8
1 czM −= )
                                                     
CS  (1) 
Overall social welfare is just the sum of the two. 
Now make it possible for entry by giving the entrant access to the relevant technology at a 
per-unit cost of pa. As is standard, we now need to make some assumptions about how the incum-
bent and the potential entrant will interact. Will the resulting competition be over price (Bertrand 
competition), perhaps over quantity (Cournot competition) and will it be simultaneous or in se-
quence (Stackelburg competition). These are standard questions for IO competition models, but 
17 Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733 (1995). 
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for now assume Cournot competition. Note now that entry means that the incumbent has two 
sources of revenue, from consumers from sales in the product market and from the entrant, from 
per unit input sales. 
With a little more math, we can come up with more results. Start with the quantities that will 
be selected by the incumbent and the entrant: 
 ( )cpzq ai 23
1 −+= , ( ae pcz 23
1 −+= )q  (2) 
We know of course that the access price will alter the entrant’s quantity but note the way in 
which it also alters the incumbent’s final quantity. The incumbent’s output is increasing in the 
access price. Higher access prices discourage entry creating greater space for the incumbent to 
produce. 
Turn next to profits to profits and consumer surplus. These are fairly complex, so it might 
help to focus on a special case, namely where the regulator sets the price of access equal to the 
marginal cost (pa = c). Note that in that case, the incumbent and the entrant produce the same 
amount, as they face the same costs and sales to the entrant are neither a source of profit or loss 
for the incumbent. Profits for the incumbent and the entrant and consumers surplus are given by: 
 ( )2
9
1 czi −=Π , ( )2
9
1 cze −=Π , ( 2
9
2 czCS a −= )  (3) 
In some sense, what we most care about are the changes relative to the first situation. Those are 
given by: 
( )2
36
5 czi −−=∆Π , ( )2
9
1 cze −=∆Π , ( 2
72
7 czCS −=∆ )  (4) 
Together this gives the increase in overall social welfare that results from Cournot entry resulting 
in a duopoly when the access price is set at marginal cost: 
 ( 2
72
5 czSWF −=∆ )  (5) 
Consumer surplus is up, profits are down and social welfare rises, though by less than the amount 
of the increase in consumer surplus. Some of the increase in consumer surplus arises from the 
additional consumers served with more competition. Another chunk of it is just a transfer away 
from producers to consumers. That part doesn’t add to social welfare; only the additional output 
actually increases social welfare. Note also that entry transfers profits away from the incumbent 
to the entrant, but, as just noted, competition reduces overall profits to the benefit of consumers. 
What does all of this say on our enforcement questions on access? We need to know what we 
are trying to accomplish. On these assumptions, we should expect the potential entrant to sue if 
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the incumbent fails to comply with its access obligations, assuming of course that the cost of liti-
gating is less than the lost profits the entrant suffers. Indeed, within the toy model, the potential 
entrant has a slightly stronger incentive to sue than the consumers (all of 1/72’s difference to be 
sure). If what we want is specific enforcement of the access obligation, we don’t necessarily need 
both the entrant and the consumers to sue. One mechanism of enforcement may suffice, and all 
would benefit from the enforcement. 
That, of course, suggests that there could be a free rider problem associated with enforcement 
resulting in specific performance. If we start to factor some chance of legal error, consumers 
might elect not to bring suit on the hopes that the entrant would pursue its remedies and the en-
trant might do the same. Of course, one way to solve the free rider problem in that situation is to 
bar either the entrant or the consumers from bringing suit. If consumers were barred from assert-
ing rights—again, either rights under the 1996 Act or the antitrust laws—we would concentrate 
the incentive to sue in the potential entrants, though we might need to worry about collective ac-
tions in that group as well. 
In contrast, if the goal of enforcement is at least partially compensatory, then just allowing 
one suit would be a mistake. The entrant has lost profits from the wrongful denial of access, while 
the consumers have lost consumer surplus. The wrongful denial of access harms both, and, as a 
general matter, when a single act hurts multiple parties, each person gets to sue for their losses. 
This is particularly relevant here, where the possibility of profits is precisely what induces en-
try—exactly what the 1996 Act seeks to encourage—and the consumer surplus that flows to con-
sumers from entry is one of the core aims of the Act. The 1996 Act seeks to foster entry to push 
the benefits of competition to consumers and to minimize the need to regulate prices in the retail 
market. Other than getting benefits to consumers, there is little reason to embrace the elaborate 
access rules of the 1996 Act. 
Another possible goal is to deter ex ante breach by incumbents through the threat of ex post 
damages. Would we achieve that if only AT&T could sue in Trinko and it could only assert its 
damages? Quite plausibly not. Look at the formulations in equation (4). The incumbent loses 
more from competition than the entrant gains (a difference of 1/36 times the squared term). The 
incumbent could afford to pay the entrant’s damages and have money left over. This just reflects 
the fact that as between the incumbent and the entrant, the incumbent’s breach is efficient. The 
incumbent and the entrant don’t want to compete since the benefits just flow to the consumers. In 
that framework, the interconnection agreement and its breach just operate as a mechanism for 
dividing up the monopoly rents. Suits by consumers alone wouldn’t suffice either, as the incum-
bent loses more from competition than the consumers gain (a difference of 3/72 times the squared 
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term). We actually need the threat of both suits to deter the breach (or, at least the threat that both 
harms will be asserted). 
An alternative approach would be to focus on the extra profits obtained by the incumbent 
from the access breach and require disgorgement. If we were merely seeking to deter the access 
breach and were not focusing on compensation to those harmed by the breach, we could assign 
the right to enforce that remedy to almost anyone. In reality, we would naturally look to entrants, 
consumers or regulators. Entrants may have the best information about whether a breach has 
taken place; they after all are squarely in the middle of trying to make the access right work and 
also have an insider’s knowledge of the business. Regulators might see multiple alleged breaches 
across many cases, and thus would have a large numbers advantage in assessing access break-
downs. Consumers would seem to be least well situated to enforce a disgorgement remedy. They 
lack direct knowledge of the interaction between the incumbent and the entrant, aren’t particu-
larly knowledgeable about the operation of the industry, and may see only one case ever. 
Whether we would require a multiplier ala antitrust treble damages depends on what we are 
trying to accomplish. It would be foolish to take on in this essay the large question of the merits 
of punitive damages.18 Consider the under-detection rationale for punitive damages, namely, that 
imperfection detection of violations creates an incentive to breach even in the face of a disgorge-
ment remedy, since some of the time the breacher will get away with it. Damage multiplying—
treble damages or punitive damages generally—might adjust for that to restore a sufficient ex 
ante penalty to deter breach.19 
We should think rationale has little role to play here, suggesting little reason for damage mul-
tipliers. Entrants should detect breaches naturally. They are calling the incumbent day by day to 
gain access to lines and other unbundled network elements. To be sure, the entrants may face 
some uncertainty, but this could just as easily result in too many claims for breach as in too few. 
Here is what all of this suggests. If we are just looking for an injunction ordering performance 
of the access right, we can assign the right to sue to either the entrant or the consumers. If may 
make sense to assign it to one or the other to avoid free-riding issues, and the entrant is almost 
certainly better situated to know whether an access breach has taken place. If we are looking to 
deter breach through disgorgement, if we believe that avoiding multiple liability is important—as 
                                                     
18 See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 Yale L.J. 2071 
(1998); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869 
(1998). 
19 For a discussion along these lines for antitrust treble damages, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: 
The Law of Competition and Its Practice 646 (2nd ed., West Group, 1999). 
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we often do20— we should again assign the right to sue and the entrant again has better informa-
tion. In the alternative, we could deter breach and compensate those harmed by the access breach 
by letting the entrant sue for lost profits and the consumers sue for lost consumer surplus. At least 
within the confines of the model, these amounts are quite distinct and readily separable. Nothing 
in the analysis suggests a role for damage multipliers based on the need to gross up damages to 
adjust for undetected breaches, as we should expect entrants to catch breaches in ordinary course. 
III. Matching the Model and the Law 
The discussion so far has been fairly abstract. The model in Section II traces out the conse-
quences of an “access breach” which results in less competition than would otherwise take place 
and assesses ways of (i) calculating damages/penalties depending in part on whether we are seek-
ing to compensate those harm or just deter breaches in the first place, and (ii) assigning enforce-
ment rights depending on why we are trying to accomplish. Both the incumbent and the entrant 
can set price to consumers, though I did treat the access price by the entrant as being set by regu-
lators. We should consider how this abstract set up matches with the substantive law of access 
and standing doctrine. 
A. Integrating Antitrust Substantive Law and the 1996 Act 
Goldwasser, Trinko and Covad consist of the standard antitrust claim soup, a mix of things 
thrown together in the hopes that something good will result. Goldwasser seemingly stated no 
independent antitrust claims, apparently in the hope that he could make the possibly easier show-
ing of a breach of the 1996 Act’s access rules and then morph that into an antitrust violation. The 
Seventh Circuit appropriately saw through that: access “rights” under the antitrust laws are noto-
riously difficult to pin down and require a substantial showing of market power and typically de-
pend on the existence of an essential facility. The 1996 Act just imposes access rights on an as-
sortment of local exchange carriers, and so there is a large difference between the substantive an-
titrust doctrine of access and that under the 1996 Act. 
Of course, Goldwasser just pled poorly, or more likely, strategically. Trinko did better, or at 
least the Second Circuit thought that he did. The court saw in the complaint a possible essential 
facilities claim and a possible monopoly leveraging claim. Certainly a careful complaint could 
allege an essential facilities claim, as such claims have succeeded before when telcom entrants 
have sought access to an incumbent’s facilities.21 The monopoly leveraging claims turns on the 
                                                     
20 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing To Sue Under the Antitrust 
Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602 (1979) and the cases cited therein. 
21 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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idea that Bell Atlantic had monopoly power in the wholesale market for local loop access and that 
it was seeking to leverage that power into a competitive advantage in the retail market. 
Finally, Covad adds to the essential facilities claims a distinct refusal to deal claim based 
upon alleged denied access and a price squeeze claim based on wholesale prices that were alleged 
to be impermissibly high. The refusal to deal claim emerges from the fact that in Aspen Skiing, 
the Supreme Court specifically disclaimed reliance on the essential facilities doctrine in finding 
that Aspen Skiing had a duty to deal with its competitor.22 As if one uncertain antitrust access 
doctrine wasn’t enough! 
We should consider the ways in which these antitrust claims might conflict with the 1996 
Act. For our purposes, the independent antitrust status of these claims probably shouldn’t matter 
too much. So, for example, whether monopoly leveraging is or isn’t a good antitrust doctrine is 
separate and apart from how it should intersect with the 1996 Act. Our concern should be the way 
in which enforcing otherwise applicable antitrust doctrines might undercut the operation of the 
Sec. 251 access rules. 
As suggested above, I find no conceptual conflict between the detailed access rules of Sec. 
251 and the contingent, general access rules of antitrust law. In the law, we often set forth a series 
of particular rules and confer on an authority—be it court or regulator—the ability to fill in gaps. 
When we do that, we routinely face the issue of how to police the regulators to ensure that they 
are honestly filling in the terms of the intentionally incomplete scheme set forth by Congress and 
not overturning that scheme. 
The cases suggest that the courts are sensitive to these issues. The antitrust savings clause of 
the 1996 Act suggests that the courts have the duty to continue to apply antitrust law to access 
situations. The Trinko majority captures this exactly when it expresses concern about injunctive 
relief “disrupting the regulatory scheme” and the need for courts to exercise restraint where in-
junctive relief is appropriate.23 
B. Standing 
Section II focused on the consequences of an access breach. Quite intentionally, nothing in 
that analysis turns on the source of the duty, that is, whether the access obligation flows from an-
titrust or from the 1996 Act. The lost profits and consumer surplus follow from the denial of ac-
cess that allows the monopoly to continue. 
                                                     
22 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611 n. 44 (1985). 
23 Trinko at 330. 
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We have two standing questions to consider. The first is purely internal to telecommunica-
tions law, namely, who has standing to asserts claims for violations of the interconnection rules 
set forth in Sec. 251. The analysis in Section II suggests that standing rules should follow quickly 
on once we figure out our general approach to remedies for access breaches. There is little reason 
to think that that analysis should not carry over as well to telecommunications law proper. That is 
not my focus here, so I will not pursue it, especially since the disagreement in Trinko between the 
majority and the dissent suggests that the statutory and doctrinal issues are not simple. 
So turn instead to the antitrust standing rule set forth in Illinois Brick. That case bars indirect 
purchasers from pursuing antitrust actions “up the chain,” so a consumer buying from a retailer 
who in turn had purchased from a manufacturer could not sue the manufacturer. Illinois Brick 
meshes with Hanover Shoe24 in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant in an antitrust 
action could not bar a claim on the basis that the overcharged plaintiff had been able to “pass on” 
the overcharges to its customers and hence had suffered no damages from the antitrust violation. 
The rule in Illinois Brick is typically defended as avoiding the risk of multiple liability.25 At 
least within the stark confines of the model here, we don’t face that problem. We can cleanly 
separate out the lost profits that a potential entrant will suffer from the reduction in consumer sur-
plus inflicted on consumers who lose the benefit of competition between the incumbent and the 
entrant. 
In Trinko, the Second Circuit noted that the interconnection cases present a different setting 
than that usually addressed by Illinois Brick. AT&T did purchase inputs from Bell Atlantic, but it 
was not “solely” a customer of Bell Atlantic. Instead, local loop access in hand, AT&T immedi-
ately competed with Bell Atlantic.26 This sufficed, in the Second Circuit’s view, to take Trinko 
outside of Illinois Brick so as to permit Trinko to satisfy the standard for antitrust standing. 
We should consider this analysis. The conventional defense of Illinois Brick focuses on the 
expected behavior of the firm purchasing the input, which is then resold to consumers. The pur-
chasing firm realizes that it is being overcharged; that each purchase brings with it treble damages 
which therefore effectively lowers the price of the input; and that competition among input pur-
chasers pushes the benefits of the damages claim to consumers.27 The success of this mechanism 
obviously depends on a fine sense of how antitrust works—oh good, we have noticed that they 
                                                     
24 Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
25 See Landes and Posner, supra note 20. 
26 Trinko at 324-25. 
27 See Landes and Posner, supra note 20, at 605-06. 
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are overcharging us, so go buy more and announce a sale price for our customers—but there is a 
more basic point as we try to carry this analysis to the interconnection access rules. 
This vision of Illinois Brick assumes ready access to the input. The whole point of the 1996 
Act’s interconnection rules is that entrants find a hard time getting access. In the extreme case, 
the denial of access is total and no damages are passed to consumer’s buying from the entrant 
because there is no entrant and there are no sales by the entrant. In the less extreme case, the de-
nial of access is at least partial. Moreover, in the situation addressed by the 1996 Act, competition 
is minimal, so there may be no press to pass on damages to customers, plus it is uncertain whether 
the entrant can actually assert antitrust damages at all. Recall that Trinko didn’t face this issue and 
left it open, while Covad clearly holds that an entrant can assert antitrust claims. Put slightly dif-
ferently, this is not an overcharge situation. To the extent that the entrant is able to get access, the 
price of access will be set pursuant to the pricing rules of Sec. 252 as implemented by state public 
utility commissions. And that price may very well be protected from inquiry under the filed rate 
doctrine. 
We should step back to see how well this analysis meshes with Supreme Court doctrine, es-
pecially as seen in the Court’s last extended look at Illinois Brick, Kansas v. Utilicorp United, 
Inc.28 In that case, the Court declined to carve out an exception for regulated industries to the 
general rule in Illinois Brick. Kansas and Missouri sought to assert parens patriae claims on be-
half of residential consumers who bought natural gas from regulated public utilities. The states 
argued that the utilities passed through 100 per cent of their costs, and hence, if natural gas pro-
ducers had overcharged the utilities, consumer should recover. 
The states also argued that the harms to the utilities and the consumers were separable and 
therefore there was no risk of multiple recoveries. The Court declined to consider that point, be-
lieving that the additional litigation burdens of allowing more parties dwarfed any possible bene-
fit of doing so.29 That was especially true, in the Court’s view, as the new litigants who would be 
added under the proposed exception—consumers—lacked expertise and experience.30 
Finally, the Court saw a substantial burden in embracing a case-by-case, industry-by-industry 
inquiry into whether Illinois Brick would apply. The core point of Illinois Brick was to simplify 
already complex antitrust litigation. Any exception to the rule would require a substantial inquiry 
as to whether the exception had been met or not, and that would increase the burden on the courts 
and on litigants. 
                                                     
28 497 U.S. 199 (1990). 
29 Id. at 213. 
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I am not sure that there is a particularly good response to that. There might be much to be 
said in favor of a “balanced budget” approach to doctrinal wrinkles. So you want to add an excep-
tion to Illinois Brick? That will increase burdens on courts and litigants, so what other doctrine 
are you willing to give up to pay for the new wrinkle? It is folly to think that we can continually 
add doctrinal refinements and not suffer any cost—either direct litigation costs or error costs—
from the increased complexity. That is the Court’s essential message in Utilicorp United and I am 
hard-pressed to believe that the Court is wrong. 
It may be too slick a response to say that we can avoid that here by treating the issue in 
Trinko as being about telecommunications standing. The idea would be to leave Illinois Brick 
alone in antitrust, but when we approach to the question of standing proper in telecommunica-
tions, ignore the underlying message of the Illinois Brick cases and allow both entrant and con-
sumers to sue. It is perhaps fair to say that the Court’s concern in Utilicorp United was the classi-
fication burden of a case-by-case Illinois Brick. If Congress chooses to do that classification for 
the courts—as it could through clear standing rules in telecommunications regarding entrants and 
consumers—the case-by-case burden would be avoided.31 
Conclusion 
The recent telecommunications trio of Goldwasser, Trinko and Covad raise interesting ques-
tions about the intersection of antitrust law and the 1996 Telecommunications Act. There are 
some nice questions about how to interleave the substance of the two regimes, but I have not con-
sidered those issues here. Instead, I have focused on the standing issues posed by a breach of an 
access obligation. As just a matter of analytics, I think there is much to be said in favor of calling 
off the standard Illinois Brick rule in the breach of access situation. In the extreme case of a full 
breach of the access duty, there is no way in which the pass through idea that supports Illinois 
Brick can function. Instead, consumers are harmed through any incremental market power that the 
incumbent can exercise because of the competition avoided though the denial of access. Whether 
we would want to confer standing on consumers would then depend on making precise what we 
were seeking to accomplish through our antitrust remedies—for example, deterrence of breach vs. 
compensation for those breaches. 
That said, the Supreme Court has expressed an understandable reluctance to add wrinkles to 
the Illinois Brick doctrine. I do not know exactly how many refinements to antitrust doctrine we 
                                                                                                                                                              
30 Id. at 215. 
31 Again, I haven’t considered here whether Congress has actually done this in the 1996 Act itself on the question of 
standing to assert breach of the access duties of the Act. 
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can afford, but I do think that the Supreme Court is well-situated to gauge when enough is 
enough. That we have already reached that point seems to be the central message of Utilicorp 
United, one that comes across sufficiently loudly that even a relatively tone-deaf academic can 
hear it.  
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